Given that the phenomenon of capture of public programs by sections the population is rampant in developing countries, households can indulge in a strategy to improve their odds of participating in public programs by bribing the suppliers of such programs. This is an important issue affecting both the supply of local public goods and the incidence of corruption. To the best of our knowledge there is no analysis of the impact of bribery on the odds of participating in a local public goods program, anywhere. Using a unique data set for rural India this paper addresses the question of whether households bribe elected officials responsible for assuring such supply to improve their access to local public goods. We find considerable evidence of such bribing. We also model the welfare effects of such bribing on groups of households as well as the impact of bribery on aggregate welfare. Several policy conclusions are advanced. JEL Classification Codes: D31, D63, D73, O12
1

I. Introduction
Local public goods including public works have often been cited as important tools for poverty alleviation in the rural sector of developing countries (World Bank 2001) . If properly designed, these have the dual advantage of reducing poverty as well as creating rural infrastructure (Scandizzo et al. 2007 ).
As a consequence several authors have studied the poverty alleviating impact of local public goods. However, an important caveat is that such goods may be subject to the phenomenon of local capture.
This issue of capture in the context of anti-poverty public goods type programs in India was first addressed by Lanjouw and Ravallion (1999) (henceforth LR). They compute average participation rates (for households) at the state level and for each per capita expenditure quintile and NSS region 1 . The average odds ratio of participation (AOP) is given by the ratio of the quintile-specific average participation rate to the overall average. The marginal oddsratio of participation (MOP) is defined as the increment to participation in that programs for any given household belonging to a specified group relative all other households. Differences between the two will reflect differences in the incidence of infra-marginal spending. If the MOP is greater than the AOP for the poorest quintile within a particular social group, then the population in the poorest quintile in this social group will benefit more than the others from a rupee increase in overall spending. In other words, there will be less capture by the non-poor from the extra spending. Jha et al. (2011) provide a broader survey of the literature on program capture particularly in the Indian context and, using large NSS data for and 2004-05, evaluate the incidence and temporal variation in two key social programs.
An interesting and important question in this context is the following. Can households indulge in a strategy to improve their odds of participating in a program of local public goods by bribing the suppliers of such programs? This is an important issue affecting both the supply of local public goods and the incidence of corruption. To the best of our knowledge there is no analysis of the impact of bribery on the odds of participating in a local public goods program, anywhere. This paper addresses the question of whether households bribe elected officials to improve their access to local public goods. Our motivation is to understand whether households can 1 Note that only those regions are considered that do not overlap over two states.
influence the odds of accessing public goods and programs if they choose to bribe those responsible for assuring such supply.
How do we interpret the impact of bribes on aggregate welfare? We know that the system of decentralization in India is significantly flawed by its failure to transfer funds, and functionaries to the local governments. Instead, local politicians, and elected officials alike are confronted with a plethora of programs managed at higher levels because of which they have significant influence over the distribution of benefits. The complexity of and multiplicity of the rules associated with these programs create information asymmetries and the elected officials have an information advantage over both the Gram Sabha and households alike. Such a system invites elite capture by the elected officials and other socio economic groups.
In this paper we will show that households use bribes as a second best solution (in fact it is one of two "second best solutions", the other being identity based voting) to overcome the pathologies associated with the system. Although paying bribes is undesirable we show that bribes enable households to participate in many programs and achieve higher consumption.
The benefits are particularly large for the ultra poor and the poor although the better off also gain from such behavior. Such a situation is not an unmixed blessing because competition between the weaker groups could lead to a significant erosion of the benefits whenever a candidate from a competing Jati wins. The net consumption gain for the poor or the ultra poor therefore cannot be identified.
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section II provides the background and data for the analysis. Section III discusses the methodology adopted in this paper. Section IV presents and discusses the results whereas section V concludes and provides some policy implications.
II. Background and Data
Post the 73 rd amendment to the Indian Constitution, political devolution has led to the emergence of Panchayats whereby a village or a group of villages is collectively referred to The nature of powers vested with the Pradhan creates conditions for information asymmetry between the Pradhan and the households, manifested particularly in issues germane to selection and identification of beneficiaries, and administration of welfare programs as well as articulation of the development needs of the village and the Panchayat to higher levels of government.
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Why do households pay bribes? Even though in the literature (Caillaud and Tirole, 2002 , Snyder and Ting, 2002 , and, Alesina and Spear, 1988 it has been argued that a decentralized political apparatus is adequate to ensure commitment by elected representatives, in socially fragmented societies where groups of households defined by their Jatis may be excluded from access to public goods, or where the system of governance is synonymous with clientelism, this assumption may not be valid. In such circumstances, second best solutions like bribing and identity based voting identity mechanisms for inclusion, ensure commitment as well as access to programs. Social networks can affect not only the quality of mutual insurance but, as Rosenzweig (2005, 2006) , Banerjee and Munshi (2004) suggest, social networks can help offset the pathologies associated with imperfect designs of the system. Evidence (Binswanger, Nagarajan and Pradhan, 2011) however suggests that these mechanisms are imperfect substitutes. Hence households in response to the persistent pathologies tend to resort to bribes as an alternate second best solution.
Much of social policy in India has been designed to afford primacy to welfare of specific groups (defined either by their ethnicity or socio-economic well being).
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The Indian Constitution also recognizes and provides impetus to policy for enhancing welfare of groups based on their socio economic status in the society. The Panchayati Raj Amendment (73   rd   ) has enabling provisions for gender, and disadvantaged groups. 4 Households therefore will derive positive externalities from membership in groups as well as social networks. The electoral process is a means for specific groups to elect a representative with a congruent identity. Voting in elections will maximize returns to specific groups and lead to significant increases in welfare of individual households that have either aligned themselves to these groups or are natural members.
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Under ideal typical conditions, decentralization and devolution is accompanied by a significant responsibility to raise local revenues. This process would allow households to enforce commitment. In the absence of such a process, and in conditions where sufficient functions, as well as functionaries have not been devolved to local governments, and instead funds are being devolved, clientelism becomes/may become the norm. Bribing and identity based voting may then become significant as methods of enforcing commitment and for accessing funds.
The system of decentralization and devolution of powers has not favored the generation of own revenue by local governments. Instead, most resources that reach the Panchayats are grants from state and national governments and reach the villages in two forms. A small proportion of funds devolved from state governments are untied grants, which are used mostly for minor repairs and maintenance and provision of public goods in a highly selective manner.
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Most programs, however, provide very specific benefits to villages, village neighborhoods or individuals in such areas as drinking water, water points, digging of private wells for irrigation, subsidies for inputs, and welfare benefits in the form of access to subsidized foods or employment schemes. Programs with individual benefits all have targeting criteria that tend to favor farmers for the inputs or members of the weaker socio- 4 There is in fact much confusion in the formulation of the implementation of policies related to decentralization and devolution. This has to do with whether empowerment through decentralization must be of households or of household groups (referred to also by some as community). Saxena (2011) argues that one of the pathologies of the implementation has to do with a lack of focus on community (in fact, inability to focus) and the fact that the current design allows for individual households trying to corner benefits meant for the community. Given the nature of formation of communities (always defined by Jatis in rural India), it is only natural that such pathologies are observed. Focus on group welfare in the Indian context will always lead to this outcome for individuals within communities will act in a way to maximize community welfare and capture benefits meant for other communities. 5 During elections held in number of states in northern India, the Muslims and Yadavs would vote as a bloc with Muslims identifying themselves with Yadavs (who are Hindu but ethnically and economically backward) in order to elect a member of the Yadav community. 6 One of the important features of "formation" of villages in India is that streets are often formed along specific line of occupation or Jati. The degree of diversification of Jati is particularly low across villages. It is often suggested that streets are a more efficient insuring unit compared to the village taken as a whole. The current dispensation of targeting and providing both untied and tied funds to households tend to reinforce these divisions. In fact the data suggest that both provision and access to public goods and welfare programs across streets within villages is extremely skewed. economic groups. The number of such programs is large and their targeting criteria and implementation mechanisms vary widely. While the village population is often supposed to approve the targeting (through the gram sabha), the complexity of the system creates information asymmetries that favor the village and higher level officials, and give them control over targeting of benefits. This is a precondition for bribing to arise and grow.
The data used in this paper are derived from the NCAER ARIS/REDS data sets. These The merged six-round panel data set is unique because it combines detailed demographic information on households, participation in welfare schemes, governance, evaluation of governance by households, composite pattern of cultivation, infrastructure, availability of public goods etc.
with community data. The data cover a period of considerable change in the rural economy of India, both in terms of structure as well as the policy regime. The data allow us to trace the impact of changes in policy on the households and therefore fix these households within a policy space.
The data are in three parts viz., listing, community, and the household. In the rounds prior to 2006 the listing data was confined to identifying households for the detailed survey. However with the current (2006) round of the survey, listing represents a census of the village and forms the basis for detailed information on incomes, occupations, voting, land holdings and network formation. The community data set contains information on the structure of governance in these villages incidence, village wide shocks, composite pattern of cultivation, infrastructure, availability of public goods etc. The household survey provides detailed information on participation in governance, welfare programs, assessment of quality of welfare programs, information on networks, voting behavior, Jati, apart from usual details of cost of cultivation, household characteristics etc.
The data for the 1999 and 2006 rounds, encompassing two Panchayat periods in most villages, are summarized in table 1. While the average number of years of schooling has increased, we find that the size of land holdings as well as household size has declined. The latter two outcomes can be attributed to household splits within the sample. Consumption expenditures have gone up during this period and poverty has declined from 31 percent to 25 percent. However, the Gini index of consumption suggests that inequality has increased significantly and has in fact gone up from 19 to 23 percent.
Villages on an average have become better connected to urban centers, and the per capita availability of infrastructure and public goods has improved. The provision of public goods like drinking water, public taps, street lighting and sanitation has improved. The proportion of cultivated area has remained stagnant, suggesting that agricultural income growth has to come primarily from productivity growth. Welfare indicators such as number of brick houses, multi storied houses and agricultural wage rates, have improved over this time period. Table 1 here ___________________ The profile of elected representatives across various types of Panchayats and over time periods reveals that in Panchayats where there is no political reservation for either women or Jatis, female representation at the level of elected representatives has declined marginally.
__________________
However, over the same time period, where there was political reservation for women or based on Jati, the proportion of female elected representatives has increased. We note that the literacy rate of elective representatives in the Panchayats headed by women (including those villages with political reservations for women) has declined.
The representation of socially marginalized Jatis in villages with political reservation for women has shown a marginal increase. A majority of the elected representatives are landless or marginal farmers (owning and cultivating less than two acres). However, we note that in villages with political reservations for either gender or Jati, the proportion of elected representatives owning and cultivating land (i.e. 2-10 acres) has increased significantly.
The data also shows that the structure of support for elected representatives in these Panchayats is identity based (identity of the elective representatives is the most important determinant of voting). Identity-based voting on the basis of Jatis is much more important than that based on religion. In addition, elected representatives get significant support from wealthy persons. However, the structure of support to the elected representatives from outside the Panchayat does not mirror that of internal support. In particular, we notice that a significant source of outside support is from political parties. All measures of political support from the outside, from Jati, religion, or political parties have increased somewhat over time. Table 2 here ___________________ What does the data say about the various dimensions of bribes? In table 3 we show that across the two Panchayat periods (past 10 years), the proportion of households that have been adversely affected by inadequate provision, quality, and governance related to community wide factors such as water, health care, roads, schooling (education), street lighting and sanitation has been persistently high and increasing (though the magnitude of increase is not very large). Similarly, the quality of household specific issues related to local governance such as implementation of public works programs, access to schools, working of the local health centers are continuing to adversely impact a large percentage of households. In addition to this incidence of malpractices associated with functioning of the public distribution system, mid day meals program beneficiary selection etc have all increased.
What is most revealing from this table is the proportion of such adversely affected households that have to pay bribes to rectify (or at least attempt to rectify) these maladies. An average of 70% of all affected households paid bribes and this increased to 72% in the current Panchayat period. Table 3 here ___________________ Another noteworthy factor is the increasing complexity of the procedures. Devolution was supposed to empower households in villages by simplifying processes and procedures. We instead find that the number of functionaries approached by an average household has more than doubled. Table 4 also points out that across all classes of households; the proportion of households that paid bribes to access functionaries and benefits has increased along with the number of functionaries contacted and approached for benefits and problem solving. Table 4 here ___________________ In table 5 the most revealing statistic is the per capita magnitude of bribes relative to the various types of welfare expenditures. We find that in 2006 nearly 19% of all benefits received from welfare programs went back as bribes. This figure was 15% in the previous Panchayat period. Are these bribes being capitalized? If so then rising bribes may not be a problem. However we find that the proportion of households that repeatedly pay bribes is very high and is increasing over time. Hence, bribes constitute a significant, directly unproductive, outflow of resources out of the village economy. Table 5 here ___________________
III. Methodology
Payment of bribes facilitates participation in welfare programs by improving the marginal odds of participation (MOP) relative to the average odds of participation (AOP). In the context of our analysis we establish this, first, by showing that MOP for groups of households that paid bribes are greater than that for groups that attempted to participate but did not pay bribe.
Before estimating MOP and AOP, it is necessary to estimate the predicted participation of households in welfare programs. We estimate the predicted participation by households with and without payment of bribes. However, we need to recognize the fact that predicted participation can be estimated directly when bribes are not paid but this cannot be estimated directly when bribes are paid because payment of bribes is endogenous to participation in welfare programs. We recognize this mutual endogeneity and use three stage least square estimation procedures to estimate the predicted participation with payment of bribes. Our modus operandi is as follows.
i) Estimation of Participation in Welfare Program without payment of bribes
We estimate the participation equation in welfare program without bribe payment as:
where i P is the change in the number of welfare programs participated in by ith household, 
ii) Estimation of Participation in Welfare Program with payment of bribes
We estimated the household's participation in welfare with payment of bribes by using three stage least square estimation procedures. We posit that changes in per capita consumption, changes in payment of bribes, and program participation are jointly determined. A three stage estimation strategy has been adopted where for a linear system of M equations which are jointly dependent on exogenous and predetermined variables. 
The distribution of the disturbances is supposed to be independent of the predetermined variables in the system, the reduced form is assumed to exist and the equations are either just identified or over identified (Kapteyn and Fiebig, 1981) .
iii) Estimating Change in Household Wealth
We estimate wealth equation and predict change in household's wealth. In a panel data framework, changes in household welfare can be affected by household splits. Predicted household splits can be adequately proxied by predicted change in wealth (Foster and Rosenzweig, 2001) . We estimate and predict the change in wealth as follows. 
iv) Estimating Changes in Per Capita Consumption
Change in household's welfare is measured by changes in its per capita consumption which is measured as follow. The unique identifiers for the consumption function are predicted changes in household wealth and regime changes. Change in wealth is a consequence of household splits and will adequately explain changes in per capita consumption at the household level. The village level regime changes will influence consumption since they affect quality of governance, service delivery, allocations across welfare programs, beneficiary selection etc.
v) Estimating Payment of Bribes
A number of factors affect the change in the magnitude of payment of bribes. We construct a bribe index to measure the intensity of payment of bribes. The bribe index (which is village level index) is measured as follows. proportion of majority Jati who voted based on identity, numerical size of own Jati and majority Jati.
vi) Estimating Participation in Welfare Programs
Change in number of welfare programs participated in is estimated in the following manner. What do bribes achieve? We wish to examine both the impact of bribes on consumption and the overall effect on specific groups of households. We use the results obtained from the 3SLS estimation and model the impact of payment of bribe on MOP and AOP as follows.
vii) Impact of payment of Bribes on Program Capture
We establish the relationship between AOP and MOP for households belonging to different consumption classes, based on whether the household paid bribes for gaining participation in welfare programs. The average participation rate for any given class of consumption per person is the proportion of households in that class of consumption per person which participates in the program. The AOP is given by the ratio of the particular consumption class-specific average participation rate to the overall average. The MOP is defined as the increment to participation in that program. If the MOP for a group is higher than the AOP then the likelihood of participation in the welfare program for any given households of that group will be higher. The benefits of welfare programs to that group will be allocated more to households of that group. We estimate the following equation.
where it AP is the average predicted participation rate for a given consumption class of a household who paid bribe or did not pay bribe, it TP is the overall participation rate across all consumption classes which is instrumented by the "leave-out mean" for a given consumption class (i.e. it LOMP ) and the village wage rate, i.e., it w , and it  is the random error term.
If, for a regression for a particular consumption class, the coefficient φ 1 is positive significant and greater (less) than 1 then the capture of the program by that consumption class has increased (decreased). If the coefficient is not significant then there has been no significant change in the incidence of capture by households in the consumption class under consideration. Households within any given consumption class that pays bribes will increase the odds of participation in the welfare program.
IV. Results
The maintained hypothesis, empirical formulation and the data allow us to use unique identifiers such as a) change in wealth b) bribe intensity index and, c) change in number of welfare programs in the villages to make robust and consistent predictions. Since the design of decentralization and devolution allows the elected representatives an undue leeway in allocation of funds and programs across households, it is important to examine whether certain forms of regime changes can have significant impacts on consumption growth. The intensity of bribes reflects both the magnitude and frequency of bribes and, in a sense, an index of village governance. We examine the role of such identifiers on program participation, bribes, and, ultimately on welfare (consumption growth). We now discuss our results.
The Hansen-Sargan tests show that the system is not over identified. We are able to conclude that the joint estimation provides a more efficient estimate of consumption growth as well as identifying significant pathologies that inhibit drivers of consumption growth.
Regime changes at the village level will affect per capita consumption growth.
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Since the structure of devolution is such that the powers of incurring expenditures as well as other decisions related to household welfare are now vested with, or heavily influenced by, elected representatives (particularly with the Pradhan), any given regime now has powers to discriminate among beneficiaries. Therefore it is important to condition consumption on the type of the elected regime. It has significant implications for policies germane to reservations (gender or caste).
Four types of regime changes are identified. If the Jati of the elected representative is congruent to a household's own Jati then it is more likely to increase the per capita consumption growth of this household. Joint estimation of consumption with payment of bribes and program participation yield several revealing results related to the role of regime changes. If there is an "adverse" regime change (i.e., the Pradhan in the current period is of a different Jati compared to that of the household) then consumption growth declines by as much as 2%, and this is not symmetric to a favorable change in the regime where the Jati of the Pradhan and the household become congruent (is the change is such that the Jati of the Pradhan is congruent of the household the impact is 6%). A gender based regime change (female to male) adversely affects consumption growth by 8%. In the context of this paper, one can conjecture at this point that a female Pradhan is less likely (on an average) to discriminate during the process of governance.
We find that the impacts of wealth and changes to household size on consumption are significant. The changes in household size (in particular increases) will have a negative effect on consumption if, in particular, participation in welfare program is limited by problems of access, and other pathologies. It is also apparent that joint estimation brings out the 10 Since household splits will have significant effects on changes in the household's welfare we identify the consumption function by changes in wealth which, itself, is predicted by household splits. Thus, estimating change in consumption function without controlling for predicted change in wealth will lead to improper identification.(Both the results and the methodology are consistent with Foster and Rosenzweig (2004)) importance of untied village resources to household consumption in an efficient manner.
There is a 9% increase in consumption growth caused by increases to untied grants. Such untied funds are also a significant source of insurance for households compared to comparable access to other types of programs. There is 13% decline in consumption growth in response to adverse household level shocks. Untied village level grants provide a significant source of insurance (the decline in consumption growth is arrested by as much as 10%).
An increase in the intensity of bribes significantly increases the magnitude and frequency of bribes for households. This result points to a systemic defect where the complexities of processes and procedures have increased and there is a general increase in the level of information asymmetry between the households and the elected officials managing the system. We also notice that the impact of members of own Jati is insignificant. In fact it could even lead to a reduction in bribes. However if the majority Jati (that is households whose Jatis are non congruent) pay bribes this is perceived as a threat to household welfare due to expected reductions in program participation and, as a consequence, significantly increases bribes (by 53%). This is important evidence of the existence of competition between Jatis for the economic pie which, itself, is being provided without clarifying the rules of access.
The number of programs in the village significantly identifies the equation for program participation. We find that the poor pay bribes and increasingly do so. What is interesting to note joint effect of growth in the payment of bribes and the growth in various types of welfare programs; we find that this has a significant impact on program participation by households. The evidence from table 5 already points out to a per capita increase in bribes and various welfare programs. The regression results confirm this and show that the joint effects are as much as 8% to 12 %. Table 6 reports results on change in participation following the payment of bribes.
______________ Table 6 here _______________ Are bribes therefore a bad? The answer is not very clear cut give their welfare effects for the poor and the ultra poor. Some of the welfare effects are discussed in tables 7 and 8. The results pertaining to program capture are particularly revealing. What they clearly indicate is that bribes increase the odds of participation of the bribe paying household relative to the rest of the households in its own group. This is suggestive of the extent of heterogeneity of groups in terms of the propensity to capture as well as the pitfalls of designing programs that tend to affect household groups. What is significant from these results is that bribes tend to expand across groups, i.e., bribes are defensive mechanism adopted by an individual household belonging to a specific group. Such measures will be adopted by households across economic groups in order to prevent program capture. Table 7 clearly proves this. The marginal odds of participation becomes significantly greater than the AOP after payment of bribes for ultra poor, poor and even for non poor households. Bribes become an economy wide phenomenon. is not maximized though it may lead to certain households or even groups of households to maximize their respective welfares. Secondly, competition between the weaker groups could lead to a significant erosion of the benefits whenever a candidate from a competing Jati wins.
The net consumption gain for the poor therefore cannot be identified from this paper.
_________________ Tables 7 and 8 here. _________________
V. Conclusions
The following conclusions can be offered.
1. Bribes are an inevitable outcome of the information asymmetries arising out of the pathologies associated with the system. They represent an attempt by households to increase their chances of participating in welfare programs.
2. Bribes actually increase individual and even group welfare. However there is no evidence that they may increase aggregate welfare as there is evidence that bribes represent a net outflow of resources from villages.
3. Program capture is/can be minimized or even avoided by participants who pay bribes. This in itself is not a positive outcome as it could lead to capture of programs by bribe-paying individuals. This ensures that bribes become an economy wide phenomenon since individuals and households compete to prevent or engage in capture.
4. Policy to counter bribes in decentralized environments is fairly obvious. The rules of access must be made clearer in addition to improving the mechanisms of targeting the various welfare programs. 13 If a household paid a bribe to participate in any one of the welfare programs then it is counted as 1 else 0.
14 If the household paid bribe to the functionary responsible for the administrator of the program then it is counted as 1 else 0. 15 If the household paid bribe to some one other than the responsible functionary due to perceived links of the recipient of the bribe to the functionary then it is counted as 1 else 0. 16 If the household participated in any one of the welfare programs then it is counted as 1 else 0. 17 If household participated in any one of the welfare programs and also paid bribe it is counted as 1 else 0. Regime change3 ( change in own Jati to other Jati) -0.020*** -2.72
